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FDI AND ITS ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: DO WE 
NEED A NEW AGENDA? 
 
Sanjaya Lall and Rajneesh Narula  
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Despite globalisation, the essential role of FDI in economic development has 
not changed. However, many mechanisms and dynamics of FDI-assisted 
development have changed: there is greater variation in the kinds of FDI, 
the benefits each offers, and the manner in which each interacts with the host 
economy. This introductory article attempts to place the discussions and 
issues raised in this special issue of The European Journal of Development 
Research within the wider literature on FDI and development. The papers 
here analyse the role of MNEs in industrial development in a ‘learning 
system’ perspective. They also analyse the policy tools available for using 
FDI for economic development in a liberalising, post-WTO world, and the 
constraints to doing this. While this is a nascent debate, this special issue 
points to a variety of ‘soft’ policy options that provide a pragmatic response 
to the complexities of globalisation.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The last two or three decades have seen a significant policy shift in the developing 
world, from inward-looking import substitution to outward-looking, market 
determined strategies. The reasons for this shift are complex, but mainly have to do 
with the inefficiencies of import substitution, the growth of globalised production and 
the success of the export-oriented Asian newly industrialised economies (NIEs). One 
key feature of liberalisation has been greater openness to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a means of acquiring technologies, skills and access to international markets, 
and of entering dynamic trade and production systems internal to MNEs.   
 
The role of the MNE as a source of capital and technology has grown over time, as 
other sources of capital have become scarcer or more volatile and technical change 
has accelerated. MNEs continue to dominate the creation of technology; indeed, with 
the rising costs and risks of innovation their importance has risen (with the exception 
of very new technology areas). They have also become more mobile, searching the 
world for lower cost, more efficient production sites and for new markets. The 
interaction of technical change (with its need for more and higher skills and better 
infrastructure) with greater FDI mobility has not reduced the need for local 
capabilities in developing countries. On the contrary, entry levels for attracting (non 
resource-extracting) FDI have risen, and investors (activities facing world 
competition) are focusing on countries with strong local capabilities. Mobile MNEs, 
in other words, seek strong complementary factors wherever they locate. There is no 
conflict over the long term between inward FDI and domestic capabilities.  
 
With this realisation, and with the growing role of MNEs in economic life in most 
countries, most developing country governments have removed restrictions on FDI 
inflows. International donors and development agencies focus more on promoting 
private rather than public capital flows as catalysts of long-term development. The 
international ‘rules of the game’ reinforce these trends, setting up a legal framework 
for minimising policy interventions in FDI. The main actions so far cover national 
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treatment for MNEs and the removal of performance requirements on them (for 
example, on local content, technology transfer or export obligations).  
 
However, liberalisation has not always increased FDI inflows into host developing 
countries. The reason is simple. The removal of restrictions on FDI does not create the 
complementary factors that MNEs need; it only allows them to exploit existing 
capabilities more freely. Thus, FDI response tends to be most vigorous where local 
capabilities are strong when liberalization takes place, and feeblest where they are 
weak (of course, excluding resource extraction). Similarly, over time, FDI inflows 
rise where local capabilities are strengthened and new capabilities are created, they 
stagnate or fall where they are not. This still has not, surprisingly, been internalised in 
policy recommendations on FDI in developing countries – much of this still proposes 
liberalization not just as a necessary but also as a sufficient condition for attracting 
FDI and extracting most development benefits from it. 
 
There is thus a need to look afresh at the role of MNEs and FDI policies in developing 
countries. This is the objective of this special issue, and one which the current paper 
seeks to highlight by placing these contributions within the context of the literature on 
FDI and development. The papers here indicate that much of what we already know 
about FDI in economic development remains valid. It is clear, for instance, that the 
creation of linkages and the internalisation of spillovers from MNE activities still 
depend on local absorptive capacity. However, we know more now on how these 
mechanisms work. Complementary assets in the host country reflect its stage of 
development, in turn influenced by its history, geography and business systems. Some 
papers in this issue increase our understanding of the nature of absorptive capacities 
in a ‘systems of learning’ perspective. 
 
This special issue also analyses the FDI policy tools, constraints and options for host 
countries in the face of the changing global economy. How do countries respond to 
the limitations on traditional policy tools placed by WTO protocols like SCM, TRIPS 
and so on? Several papers point to the ‘soft’ policy options that may provide an 
appropriate response to the complexities of globalisation.  
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2. Development Constraints and Opportunities Offered by FDI 
 
The Washington consensus holds, in broad terms, that markets for knowledge are 
efficient, and that FDI flows will – ceteris paribus – generate positive externalities for 
domestic firms.  This presumes that all MNE activity offers similar spillovers and 
development benefits. Its focus is thus mainly on the quantity of FDI rather than its 
quality. There are four points here that we must qualify.  
 
The competence and scope of subsidiaries: The quality of FDI spillovers depends on 
the scope and competence of the subsidiary. These depend partly on factors internal to 
MNEs, including their internationalization strategy, the role of particular affiliates in 
their global system and the motivation for their investment. Internal strategies interact 
with host country capabilities and resources [Benito et al 2003]. Affiliates 
undertaking complex activities need high levels of local competence: advanced 
specialised skills, strong industrial and service firms and clusters, and strong support 
institutions. Where host countries cannot provide high level local assets, MNEs will 
not set up high quality affiliates. For instance, R&D activities concentrate in the few 
locations that can provide the advanced resources and institutions.  
 
However, once MNEs establish operations in a country, affiliates often develop new 
capabilities: thus, the sophistication of affiliates also reflects how long they have been 
in operation, as documented for East Asia [Rasiah 1994, 1995]. However, such 
upgrading is not automatic or universal: affiliates have build upon advantages that 
already exist in the host economy – local capabilities matter [Ritchie 2002]. Over 
time, the upgrading of affiliates has generally responded to improvements in domestic 
capabilities. Mortimore & Vergara find that the nature of a foreign investment 
depends initially on the host country’s technological, human resource and supplier 
capabilities. They examine the case of Intel in Costa Rica and Toyota in Mexico and 
argue that in the case of Costa Rica both the lead MNE and the host country were able 
to achieve their respective objectives. Mexico, on the other hand, was not able to 
capitalise on the opportunities provided by Toyota’s investment.  
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While the scope of affiliate activities can be modified rapidly, developing new 
capabilities takes time. Foreign investments in high value-added activities (needing 
high competence levels) tend to be ‘location-sticky’. MNEs undertake sequential 
investments (and in building higher levels of competences) in locations that provide 
sub-optimal returns but where they have prior experience [Hagedoorn and Narula 
2001].  
 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) suggest that host country characteristics that influence 
the extent of linkages are market size, local content regulations and the size and 
technological capability of local firms. They argue that linkages increase over time as 
the skill level of local entrepreneurs grows, new suppliers emerge and local content 
increases [see also Driffield and Noor 1999, McAleese and McDonald 1978, Gorg 
and Ruane 1998, Scott-Kennel and Enderwick 2001]. Nonetheless, there are many 
instances where upgrading, linkages and spillovers have not grown over time. 
 
The motive for the investment: The motive for a foreign investment is crucial in 
determining how linkages and externalities develop. There are four main motives for 
investment: 1) seek natural resources; 2) seek new markets; 3) restructure existing 
foreign production and 4) seek new strategic assets [Narula and Dunning 2000]. 
These can be placed into two categories. The first includes the first three motives: 
asset-exploiting, to generate economic rent by using existing firm-specific assets. The 
second is the fourth motive: asset-augmenting, to acquire new assets that protect or 
enhance existing assets. In general, developing countries are unlikely to attract the 
second category of FDI; they primarily attract the first category.  
 
The relative importance of each motive partly reflects the stage of economic 
development [Narula and Dunning 2000, Narula, 1996, 2004]. Least developed 
countries would tend to have mainly resource-seeking FDI and countries at the 
catching-up stage mostly market-seeking FDI. Efficiency-seeking investments, with 
the most stringent capability needs, will tend to focus on the more industrialised 
developing economies (though three or four decades ago they went to countries with 
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relatively low capabilities, e.g. the electronics industry in Southeast Asia in the 
1970s). 
 
Not all affiliates offer the same spillovers to host economies. A sales office, for 
instance, may have a high turnover and employ many people, but its technological 
spillovers will be limited relative to a manufacturing facility. Likewise, resource-
seeking activities like mining tend to be capital intensive and provide fewer spillovers 
than market-seeking manufacturing FDI. During import substitution, most MNEs set 
up miniature replicas of their facilities at home, though many functions were not 
reproduced (they were 'truncated'). The extent of truncation, however, varied by host 
country. The extent most important determinants of truncation – and thus the scope of 
activities and competence of the subsidiary – were market size and local industrial 
capabilities [Dunning and Narula 2004]. Countries with small markets and weak 
local industries had the most truncated subsidiaries, often only single-activity 
subsidiaries (sales and marketing or natural resource extraction). Larger countries 
with domestic technological capacity (such as Brazil and India) had the least truncated 
subsidiaries, often with R&D departments.  
  
With liberalisation, MNE strategies on affiliate competence and scope have changed 
in four ways [Dunning and Narula 2004]. First, there has been investment in new 
affiliates. Second, there has been sequential investment in upgrading existing 
subsidiaries. Third, there has been some downgrading of subsidiaries, whereby MNEs 
have divested in response to location advantages elsewhere or reduced the level of 
competence and scope of subsidiaries. Fourth, there has been some redistribution of 
ownership as the result of privatisation or acquisitions of local private firms. In many, 
but certainly not all, cases this also led to a downgrading of activities.  
 
MNEs are taking advantage of liberalisation to concentrate production capacity in a 
few locations, exploiting scale and agglomeration economies, favourable location and 
strong capabilities. Some miniature replicas have been downgraded to sales and 
marketing affiliates, with fewer opportunities for spillovers. Countries that receive 
FDI with the highest potential for capability development are, ironically, those with 
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strong domestic absorptive capacities. The paper by Barnes & Lorentzen on South 
Africa shows that domestic capacity – in the form of infrastructure or an efficient 
domestic industrial sector – is a primary determinant of high competence affiliates. 
They base their analysis on eight case studies in the South African automotive sector, 
and show that indigenous firms can compete with MNEs, and - given the appropriate 
domestic capabilities and infrastructure – can maintain and improve their competitive 
advantages through indigenous innovation.  
 
Like South Africa, other countries have succeeded in attracting such FDI, notably 
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin [ECLAC 2000, 2001, Mortimore 2000]. In addition 
to providing a threshold level of domestic capabilities and infrastructure, these 
countries have invested in developing their knowledge base (although to a lesser 
extent in the case of Mexico). Mortimore (2000) argues much of this FDI has created 
export platforms for MNEs with limited benefits for the host countries [ECLAC 
2001]. This is a point reiterated by Mytelka & Barclay in the case of Trinidad, where 
FDI has not been leveraged to develop skills and capabilities of local downstream and 
supporting firms. The state has largely failed to act as a facilitator to stimulate and 
support domestic absorptive capacities and linkages with MNE affiliates. 
 
MNE linkages: FDI transfers technology to local firms in four ways: backward 
linkages, labour turnover, horizontal linkages and international technology spillovers. 
Studies of backward linkages have identified various determinants, including those 
internal to MNEs and those associated with host economies. The ability of the host 
economy to benefit from MNE linkages have been found to depend crucially on the 
relative technological capabilities of recipient and transmitter: the greater the distance 
between them, the lower the intensity of linkages. 
 
Again, MNE motives and strategies matter. Domestic market oriented affiliates 
generally purchase more locally than export-oriented firms because of lower quality 
requirements and technical specifications [Reuber et al. 1973, Altenburg 2000].  
MNE affiliates are more likely to be integrated with host countries where they source 
relatively simple inputs [Ganiatsos 2000, Carillo 2001]. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) 
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argues that MNEs create more linkages when they use intermediate goods intensively, 
communication costs between parent and affiliate are high and the home and host 
markets are relatively similar in terms of intermediate goods. Affiliates established by 
M&As are likely to have stronger links with domestic suppliers than those established 
by greenfield investment [UNCTAD 2000, Scott-Kennel and Enderwick 2001], since 
the former may find established linkages that are likely to retain if they are efficient. 
Linkages vary significantly by industry. In the primary sector, the scope for vertical 
linkages is often limited, due to the use of continuous production processes and the 
capital intensity of operations. In manufacturing, the potential for vertical linkages are 
broader, depending on the extent of intermediate inputs to total production and the 
type of production processes [Lall 1980]. 
 
Scott-Kennel examines linkage formation between foreign affiliates and domestic 
firms, as well as the resource flows from the parent MNE to the affiliate. Although 
she studies New Zealand, her findings are relevant to developing countries. New 
Zealand is highly dependent on natural resources, has moved away from import 
substitution relatively recently and is a small peripheral economy. On the other hand, 
it has well-developed infrastructure and high skill levels. Her results confirm that 
there are considerable opportunities for linkage formation when location advantages 
are appropriate, the extent of linkages varying by the type of FDI.  
 
Bell & Marin suggest some caution in applying results such as Scott-Kennel’s to 
developing and intermediate countries. They argue that methodologies to measure and 
evaluate knowledge spillovers in advanced economies depends upon a concrete 
understanding of the interactions between processes, industrial structures, resource 
endowments and the like, and these have been stylised in the spillovers literature with 
advanced economies in mind. Using data from Argentina, they argue that a well-
established domestic sector which has evolved independently of MNEs may mean 
that the traditional view that spillovers are largely one-way is simplistic. Co-location 
of domestic and foreign firms in intermediate economies has benefits for both groups 
of firms, and productivity growth in the domestic sector may not necessarily derive 
from MNE spillovers. Indeed, as also observed by Katrak (2002) in the case of India, 
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knowledge creation mechanisms of MNE subsidiaries and domestic firms are 
sometimes largely independent. Better methods to measure and understand the 
direction and flow of knowledge is required before the controversy regarding the 
benefits of FDI and spillovers is settled.  
 
Nature of MNE assets: Although it is a reasonable assumption that MNEs have 
superior firm-specific assets, the assets they transfer to particular host countries are 
not always those that the latter seeks or is able to assimilate. MNE competitive 
advantages derive from three types of assets. The first is associated with technology 
(knowledge, capabilities or machinery and equipment). The second is associated with 
the conduct of transactions, based on superior intra-firm hierarchies within and across 
national borders. The third is multinationality itself, the advantages of ‘common 
governance’. These are transaction assets – MNEs gain rent from their superior 
knowledge of markets and internal governance of transactions. Thus, MNEs may have 
similar technologies to domestic counterparts but still out-compete them. In such 
cases, technological spillovers will not occur, though other types of spillovers might 
occur (say, through employee mobility or vertical links to suppliers) [Narula and 
Marin 2003].  
 
Even where absorptive capacity exists, MNE assets may be very tacit and internal to 
the firms, as with transaction-type advantages. These assets cannot be acquired easily 
by local firms. This may go some way to explaining the findings of Bell & Marin and 
their persuasive discussion about the difficulties of measuring and evaluating 
spillovers. As they emphasise in their paper, not all MNE subsidiaries in developing 
countries the same capacity to act as generators of knowledge spillovers. 
 
3. Absorptive Capacity 
 
How does the nature of location advantages determine the ability of the domestic 
economy to absorb spillovers from FDI? As almost all the papers in this special issue 
illustrate, the presence of externalities does not mean either that the domestic 
economy can internalize them, or that the externalities are significant in quantity or 
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quality. Absorptive capacity is significant for development because it allows domestic 
actors to capture knowledge that exists elsewhere. Where absorptive capacity is 
lacking in domestic firms, they may, instead of reaping technological benefits from 
FDI, be ‘crowded out’ [Agosin and Mayer 2000].  
 
Capabilities in the host country context matter for the magnitude and intensity of 
technological upgrading. As Portelli and Narula (2004) have shown in the case of 
Tanzania, FDI in activities that match the comparative advantage of the host country 
provides greater linkages. Wider technology gaps between domestic and foreign-
owned activities tend to lead to less backward linkages and to lower technological 
content in the inputs sourced locally.  
 
Several authors, like Findlay (1978) and Perez and Soete (1988), have noted that a 
minimum level of scientific and technical knowledge is required to use innovation. 
Below this level, the cost of adoption can be prohibitive. This is particularly true for 
FDI. Borensztein et al. (1998) show that, at country level, a minimum threshold of 
absorptive capacity is necessary for FDI to contribute to higher productivity growth. 
At the firm level, Narula and Marin (2003) show that only firms with high absorptive 
capacity are likely to benefit from FDI spillovers. Xu (2000) also shows that a country 
needs to reach a minimum human capital threshold level in order to benefit from 
technology transfer.  
 
While insufficient absorptive capacity tends to lead to the inefficient use of 
technology inflows, knowledge accumulation is much more rapid once the threshold 
level of absorptive capacity is crossed. Simply put, technology absorption is easier 
once countries have “learned-to-learn” [Criscuolo and Narula 2002]. The cost of 
imitation increases as the follower closes the gap with the leader and the number of 
technologies available for imitation falls. This implies that there are diminishing 
returns on marginal increases in absorptive capacity as firms approach the frontier of 
knowledge [Narula 2004].  
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Kokko et al. (2001) highlight the role of past industrialization experience as a 
precondition for technology transfer. The absence of such experience is concomitant 
to lack of local absorptive capacity [Radosevic 1999]. For example, in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the conditions that stimulate technological assimilation (such as developed 
human capital, adequate physical infrastructure and a dynamic business climate) are 
absent. This constrains the ability of African countries to master foreign technology 
and to compete in international markets [Mytelka 1985, Lall and Pietrobelli 2002]. 
The development of capacities and capabilities is key to both attracting FDI as well as 
to increasing MNE technological spillovers.  
 
Narula (2004) decomposes absorptive capacity into four constituent parts: firm-sector 
absorptive capacity, basic infrastructure, advanced infrastructure and formal and 
informal institutions. Each is indispensable and each has different costs and benefits 
at different stages of development. Increases in absorptive capacity at earlier stages of 
development are associated with “generic” basic infrastructure and increases in 
technological capacity generally have positive welfare effects. For example, increases 
in the percentage of population with primary and secondary education have numerous 
welfare benefits, as does the provision of infrastructure. Investment in such resources 
has large multiplier effects.  
 
4. Taking a Systems View to Absorption and Industrial Development 
 
Several contributions here (Mytelka & Barclay, Barnes & Lorentzen, Bell & 
Marin and Rasiah) stress that industrial development and absorptive capacity must 
be seen from a ‘systems’ view.  By this we mean that while learning and absorption 
take place at the firm level, the success or failure of individual firms occurs within a 
“system”.1 Within a system, there exists a broad knowledge base outside industrial 
enterprises; this base is central to technological accumulation by industry. Leaning 
and innovation involve complex interactions between firms and their environment. 
The environment consists of the firms’ networks of direct customers and suppliers but 
it stretches much further. It also includes the broader factors shaping their behaviour 
and activities: the social and cultural context; the institutional and organizational 
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framework; infrastructure; knowledge creating and diffusing institutions, and so on. 
This is the essence of the systems approach to technology.  
 
“System” does not necessarily mean that the influences on industrial innovation are 
systematically organized [Narula 2003]. To put it simply, “system” means a regularly 
interacting or interdependent group forming a unified whole. A system is in most 
cases the serendipitous intertwining of institutions and economic actors that defines 
the stock of knowledge in a given location [Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000]. For 
instance, changes in the educational policies of the government are likely to affect 
other actors and institutions, and influence the process and extent of technological 
learning in the future.   
 
In a system, the efficiency of economic actors – firm or non-firm – depends on how 
much and how efficiently they interact amongst themselves. The means by which 
interactions take place are referred to as ‘institutions’ in the economics literature, 
though sociologists prefer to speak of ‘social capital’. Institutions are the “sets of 
common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the 
interaction between individuals and groups” [Edquist and Johnson 1997]. Institutions 
create the milieu within which innovation is undertaken; they establish the ground 
rules for interaction between economic actors and represent a sort of “culture”. 
Institutions are associated with public sector organizations, but are not exclusively so. 
It is not only the creation of new knowledge but also the diffusion of extant 
knowledge that determine the national knowledge stock and the accumulation of 
national absorptive capacity.  
 
The role of formal institutions has traditionally been considered under the rubric of 
political economy and has been the focus of debate on the role of the state in 
establishing, promoting and sustaining learning. It is not our intention to review the 
debate on the role of industrial policy in industrial development, highlighted in a 
special issue of Oxford Development Studies (Volume 31, no 1). The contributors to 
our special issue largely believe that governments are essential to promoting inter-
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linkages between the elements of absorptive capacity and to creating the opportunities 
for economic actors to absorb and internalise spillovers. 
 
The importance of building institutions cannot be overstated: Rodrik et al. (2002) 
argue that efficient institutions contribute more to economic growth than location or 
trade. Institutions can be formal or informal. Formal institutions include the 
intellectual property regime, competition policy, technical standards, taxation, 
incentives for innovation, education and the like. Informal institutions are more 
difficult to define, but are associated with creating and promoting links between the 
various actors. For example, the government may play a role in encouraging firms to 
collaborate with universities or in promoting entrepreneurship.  
 
Developing countries have switched reluctantly from inward-looking strategies with a 
large role for the government to market-friendly strategies that forces them to face a 
new multilateral milieu, one in which they have little experience and with which they 
are often poorly prepared to cope. Institutions continue to remain largely independent 
and national. While formal institutions can be legislated, modifying and developing 
informal institutions is a complex and slow process, since they cannot be created 
simply by government fiat. The developed have taken 50 years to liberalise and 
adjust, but even they have faced considerable inertia. They have, for instance, has yet 
to reform their agricultural sectors.  
 
5. Industrial Policy and FDI-assisted Development 
 
The papers in this special issue all point to a basic paradox: with weak local 
capabilities, industrialization has to be more dependent on FDI. However, FDI cannot 
drive industrial growth without local capabilities.  The neoliberal approach favoured 
by the Washington consensus which leaves capability development to free market 
forces provides few realistic answers. It can result in slow and truncated technological 
development, with gaps between countries rising. Some upgrading does take place, 
but is slower and more limited than with the promotion of local capabilities. Given the 
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speed at which technologies are changing and path-dependence and cumulativeness in 
capability building, it can lead to latecomers being mired in low growth traps.  
 
The policy needs of capability building have not changed much. They are direct – the 
infant industry case to provide ‘space’ for enterprises to master new technologies 
without incurring enormous and unpredictable losses – and indirect, to ensure that 
skill, capital, technology and infrastructure markets meet their needs. There is also a 
need to coordinate learning across enterprises and activities, when these are linked in 
the production chain and imports cannot substitute effectively for local inputs. At the 
same time, technical change makes it necessary to provide more access to 
international technology markets; it also makes it more difficult to anticipate which 
activities are likely to succeed. The information needs of industrial policy rise in 
tandem with technological change and complexity. The greater complexity of 
technology does not make selectivity unfeasible. Detailed targeting of technologies, 
products or enterprises may be more difficult because of the pace of change, but 
targeting at higher levels is feasible and more necessary. Technological progress may 
actually make industrial policy easier in some respects: information on technological 
trends and markets is more readily available, more is known about the policies in 
successful countries and benchmarking is easier.  
 
The spread of integrated production systems makes it more difficult and risky to take 
the route used by the East Asian NIEs. It is much easier for countries to attract 
segments of MNE activity and build upon these rather than to develop local 
capabilities independently. All the later entrants into globalized systems, from 
Malaysia to Mexico and Costa Rica, have gone the FDI route. However, as FDI 
regimes become more liberal, MNEs are also less willing to part with valuable 
technologies to independent firms. 
  
Globalization does not do away with the need for all selective industrial policies; it 
only reduces the scope and raises the potential cost of some. FDI is complementary to 
local enterprises and capabilities after a certain level of development. Strong local 
capabilities raise the possibility of attracting high value systems and of capturing skill 
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and technology spillovers from them; these capabilities need selective policies. 
Moreover, attracting export-oriented FDI increasingly requires selective promotion 
and targeting; the most effective targeting is undertaken by advanced economies 
[Loewendahl, 2001]. 
 
Lall (1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2003) and Wade (1990) among others point to the need of a 
holistic approach to selecting and leveraging sectors for dynamic growth along with 
stable government, transparent policies and basic infrastructure and skills. The role of 
governments as a market facilitator and provider of complementary assets is more 
critical [Narula 2003]. 
 
The provision of basic location advantages is perhaps most significant for pre-
catching up and catching-up economies, where firms rely on governments to provide 
public and quasi-public goods. As countries reach a threshold level of technological 
capabilities and start catching up in earnest, governments need to provide more active 
support. This means developing specific industries and technological trajectories, so 
that their location advantages grow less ‘generic’. In other words, their role as market 
facilitator and provider of complementary location-specific advantages becomes more 
critical [Dunning 1997, Stopford 1997]. 
 
The paper by Rasiah undertakes a comparative analysis of export performance and 
technological capabilities of foreign and local firms in three Asian countries. He 
suggests that the role of governments is critical to providing the necessary technology 
infrastructure, support for technology activity in the form of subsidies, training and 
R&D organizations, and special programs to foster firm-university relationships. By 
doing so, governments create a ‘strong latent capacity to stimulate technology 
transfer’ by MNEs.  
 
While several papers contribute to the discussion of the role of government in 
promoting FDI-assisted development, they do not point to an optimal set of policies. 
Lauridsen discusses the role of the state in Thailand. As he illustrates, it is one thing 
that appropriate policies are adopted; it is quite another whether they are effectively 
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implemented. Political and social constraints can severely affect the outcome. A 
similar point is also made by Mytelka & Barclay, using the contrasting examples of 
Costa Rica and Trinidad. Mortimore & Vergara argue that it is important to have 
policies to induce MNEs to improve and upgrade capabilities to sustain more 
sophisticated industrial activities, not just by attracting the initial investment but also 
but also by encouraging MNEs to realize dynamic comparative advantages in the host 
economy. 
  
Liberalisation provides the policy framework for globalisation. However, it often 
administers a major ‘shock’ to industries and institutions in most countries, 
introducing not just import competition and new actors (MNEs), but also calling for 
the restructuring of institutions (legal codes, political structures, policy orientation). 
Sudden exposure to the full force of international competition will not facilitate their 
institutional adjustment, as illustrated by the chaotic state of the ex-Soviet economies. 
FDI does not necessarily help institutional restructuring. As Kogut (2000: 34) notes: 
 
Institutions, however, do not travel by the arteries of multinational 
corporations. They reflect patterns of behaviour that are inscribed in legal 
codes and political and economic relationships. Outside the power of any one 
actor to change, institutions are social agreements that guide and coordinate 
the interdependent acts of economic actors in a country. 
 
The lack of success of liberalization in many countries reflects both the failure to 
integrate aspects of policy in a systemic way and the difficulty of changing inherited 
institutions. Most countries have attempted to graft the new model on to the remnants 
of the old one, because interest groups and institutions are resistant or expensive to 
change. While liberalization has helped correct many inefficiencies, improving 
macro-economic fundamentals and reducing the excessive role of the state in 
industrial activity, it has also led to a rapid and overzealous reduction in the state’s 
provision of the public and quasi public goods that are necessary for industrial 
development [Ramos 2000, Katz 2001, Alcorta 2000]. 
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The debate on how best to respond to the industrial policy challenges in an 
interdependent world continues. The contribution by Chang emphasises the lack of an 
alternative model to infant-industry protection, which he argues is a case of ‘kicking 
away the ladder’ by the rich countries. Chang acknowledges that a return to the 
import-substitution model is no longer feasible, because globalisation is largely 
irreversible, and that international competition does help reduce inefficiencies. 
Nonetheless, catch-up through infant industry promotion has always been the bedrock 
of industrial development [see also Chang 2002, and Wood et al 2003 for further 
discussion] and as yet no clear alternative has presented itself.  
 
It is difficult to see how host countries that have FDI can tap its potential fully without 
such strategies as local content rules, incentives for deepening technologies and 
functions, inducements to export and so on. Performance requirements have been 
deployed inefficiently in many countries, but, as with protection, they have also been 
used very effectively by others. Catching up implies the absorption and mastery of 
existing technology, and this implies that there is knowledge available for imitation 
and that rules permit firms to imitate. Multilateral and bilateral agreements such as 
TRIPs, TRIMs and SCM severely limit the potential for developing countries to use 
traditional policy instruments to protect learning and promote reverse engineering, so 
reducing opportunities to build domestic industrial capacity. 
 
The paper by Malhotra addresses the agenda of FDI and development from the 
perspective of supra-national agreements. He highlights the need to rethink 
agreements such as TRIMs and TRIPS in light of the human development agenda, 
rather than the current singular focus on economic growth. Malhotra also argues that 
multilateral and bilateral investment agreements have dubious benefits since they 
restrict the policy autonomy of developing countries, and may increase transaction 
costs, while simultaneously increasing opportunity costs. 
 
Several papers in this issue highlight that while policies such as local content 
requirements may no longer be feasible, a variety of ‘soft’ policies remain available to 
host countries to encourage MNEs to create linkages. Mortimore & Vergara 
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recommend the targeting of lead MNEs as a means of creating clustering. They 
illustrate their argument with two contrasting cases, one of which achieved impressive 
results, and the other which failed. Lauridsen and Mytelka & Barclay also present 
suggestions for the use of soft policy options.  
 
The critical issue facing the development community in industrialization is whether 
the degree of policy freedom left to developing countries is sufficient to promote FDI 
assisted industrial development without strong policy intervention. WTO rules do not 
prohibit all selective interventions, only those that affect trade. However, other forces 
making for liberalization are less formal and rule-based (structural adjustment 
programmes, bilateral trade and investment agreements and pressures by rich 
countries) and they are as powerful. Together they constitute a formidable web of 
constraints on governments mounting industrial policy. Some constraints may be 
useful and may prevent the more egregious forms of intervention that have led to 
inefficiency, rent-seeking and technological sloth. They are also beneficial to 
countries with strong capabilities developed behind protective barriers: India, Brazil 
or China should accelerate liberalization if they can combine this with a strategy to 
restructure activities and enter promising new activities.  
 
The permissible tools are probably not enough to foster the rapid development of 
technological capabilities. They may force poor countries with weak industrial bases 
to become over-dependent on FDI to drive industrial development. This cannot meet a 
major part of industrialization needs. Even countries able to plug into global 
production systems can only do so as providers of low-level labour services; 
subsequent deepening may be held back by constrictions on capability development. 
For developing countries with a capability base the rules can deter diversification into 
new technologies and activities. In general, the rules threaten to freeze comparative 
advantage in areas where capabilities exist at the time of liberalization, yielding a 
relatively short period of competitive growth before the stock is ‘used up’. 
Subsequent upgrading of competitiveness is likely to be slower than if governments 
had the tools to intervene selectively.   
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our objective in writing this introductory paper has been to place the various 
contributions to this special issue in the context of the broad range of inter-
disciplinary research on FDI and development.  
 
To return to the question posed in the title of this paper, ‘do we need a new agenda?’, 
the papers here suggest that although the mechanisms underlying FDI and 
development have not changed, the intricacies of these mechanisms need to better 
understood if they are to prove beneficial. All the contributors here are also 
unanimous in their scepticism of the Washington consensus and the rather simplistic 
view taken by certain mainstream economists that FDI is a sine qua non for economic 
development. Market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in 
developing and promoting a proactive industrial policy. MNEs and FDI may well lead 
to an increase in productivity and exports, but they do not necessarily result in 
increased competitiveness of the domestic sector or increased industrial capacity, 
which ultimately determines economic growth in the long run. FDI per se does not 
provide growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial sector exists which has the 
necessary technological capacity to profit from the externalities from MNE activity. 
This is well illustrated by the inability of many Asian countries that have relied on a 
passive FDI-dependent strategy to upgrade their industrial development. 
 
At the same time, the findings in this volume also suggest that liberalisation and 
increasing cross-border economic activity associated with globalisation are largely 
irreversible, and have changed the ‘rules of the game’. This implies that traditional 
policy tools are not as effective as they might have been in the past. However, it is 
still a matter of conjecture what the long-term developmental effects of many of the 
supra-national and bilateral agreements will be.  In this regard, our contributors would 
suggest, we do need a new agenda if FDI is to be leveraged efficiently to promote 
development.  
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Notes 
 
1 These have been referred to as innovation systems (see e.g., Lundvall 1992, Edquist 1997) or learning 
systems (Lall 1992, Viotti 2002).  
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